Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide by Mankiw, N & Weinzierl, Matthew
 
Dynamic Scoring: A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Mankiw, N. Gregory and Matthew Weinzierl. 2005. Dynamic
scoring: A back-of-the-envelope guide. Harvard Institute of
Economic Research Working Papers 11000.
Published Version http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11000.html
Accessed February 17, 2015 4:38:10 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2770515
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAADynamic Scoring:
A Back-of-the-Envelope Guide
N. Gregory Mankiw Matthew Weinzierl
Harvard University Harvard University
Revised: December 12, 2005
Abstract
This paper uses the neoclassical growth model to examine the extent
to which a tax cut pays for itself through higher economic growth. The
model yields simple expressions for the steady-state feedback e⁄ect of
a tax cut. The feedback is surprisingly large: for standard parameter
values, half of a capital tax cut is self-￿nancing. The paper considers
various generalizations of the basic model, including elastic labor supply,
general production technologies, departures from in￿nite horizons, and
non-neoclassical production settings. It also examines how the steady-
state results are modi￿ed when one considers the transition path to the
steady state.
We are grateful to Brent Neiman, Jim Poterba, Aleh Tsyvinski, Alan Viard, and the
referees for helpful comments.
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To what extent does a tax cut pay for itself? This question arises regularly for
economists working at government agencies in charge of estimating tax revenues.
Traditional revenue estimation, called static scoring, assumes no feedback from
taxes to national income. The other extreme, illustrated by the renowned
La⁄er curve, suggests that tax cuts can generate so much economic growth
that they completely (or even more than completely) pay for themselves. Most
economists are skeptical of both polar cases. They believe that taxes in￿ uence
national income but doubt that the growth e⁄ects are large enough to make tax
cuts self-￿nancing. In other words, tax cuts pay for themselves in part, and the
open question is the magnitude of the e⁄ect.
In 2002 the sta⁄ of the Joint Tax Committee, prompted by several members
of Congress, started work on the di¢ cult task of dynamic scoring of tax policy.
That is, they started developing a set of economic models that might be used to
estimate the feedback e⁄ects of tax proposals. Dynamic scoring also received
prominent discussion in a 2003 report by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce and
the 2004 Economic Report of the President. The task of dynamic scoring is
formidable, because there is little agreement about how best to model long-run
economic growth and the e⁄ect of taxes on the economy.1
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what the neoclassical growth
model can contribute to this endeavor. The neoclassical growth model, ￿rst
introduced by Ramsey (1928), is the most widely taught model of capital accu-
mulation and long-run growth and is the workhorse of modern growth theory.
For example, see the popular graduate-level textbooks by Romer (2001) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999). This model is also widely used for thinking
about issues in public ￿nance (Chamley 1986; Judd 1985). Here we use the
neoclassical growth model to consider the revenue e⁄ects of changes in tax rates
on capital and labor income. One virtue of the model is that it sheds light on
the key parameters that govern these revenue e⁄ects. The model also yields
simple formulas for how much the dynamic estimates of these revenue e⁄ects
di⁄er from the static estimates.2
These formulas permit some illuminating back-of-the-envelope calculations.
For conventional parameter values, the model implies substantial feedback ef-
fects in the steady state. For example, suppose that the initial tax rates on
capital and labor are 25 percent, the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the
1Auerbach (2005) provides a good introduction to the economic and policy issues involved
in dynamic scoring.
2In addition to the works already cited, our analysis is related to several strands of the liter-
ature on ￿scal policy. One prominent example is Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ (1987), who analyze
tax changes using computer-based simulations of overlapping-generations models. The subset
of the literature closest to this paper has typically focused on La⁄er e⁄ects: the possibility
that tax cuts can be fully self-￿nancing (e.g., Ireland 1994, Pecorino 1995, Agell and Persson
2001, and Novales and Ruiz 2002). McGrattan (1994) uses a framework similar to ours but is
primarily concerned with the impact of changing taxes on explaining economic ￿uctuations;
the feedback e⁄ect of tax rates on tax revenue is implicit in her analysis. Finally, a classic
reference is Feldstein (1974), which uses an approach parallel to the one we employ here but
is focused on tax incidence rather than revenue e⁄ects.
2capital share is one-third, and labor supply is inelastic. Then, in the steady
state, the dynamic e⁄ect of a cut in capital income taxes on government revenue
is only 50 percent of the static e⁄ect. That is, one-half of a capital tax cut pays
for itself.
There are various ways in which the benchmark Ramsey model can be gener-
alized. One is to include elastic labor supply. We show that this generalization
has only minor e⁄ects on the analysis of capital income taxes, but it has sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ects on the analysis of labor income taxes. We assume a form of
preferences that yields no trend in hours worked, as the uncompensated elastic-
ity of labor supply is zero. The compensated (constant-consumption) elasticity
of labor supply, however, need not be zero. If this elasticity is one-half and the
other parameters are as described above, then the steady-state feedback from
a labor income tax cut rises from zero to 17 percent. The model shows that,
regardless of the labor supply elasticity, if capital and labor tax rates start o⁄at
the same level, cuts in capital taxes have greater feedback e⁄ects in the steady
state than cuts in labor taxes.
Another way to generalize the model is to consider production functions that
are not Cobb-Douglas. We show that the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor has a crucial role in determining the dynamic feedback of a
change in capital taxes. If the elasticity of substitution is raised from 1.0 to
1.5, the steady-state feedback from a capital tax cut rises from 50 percent to 71
percent. Conversely, if the elasticity is lowered from 1.0 to 0.75, the feedback
falls from 50 percent to 44 percent. We discuss various reasons to believe that
this crucial elasticity may di⁄er from unity.
Many economists are skeptical of the Ramsey model because of its assump-
tion of an in￿nite-horizon consumer. We therefore introduce ￿nite horizons
in two ways. We ￿rst add some rule-of-thumb households that consume their
entire labor income in each period, but we ￿nd that this has no e⁄ect on the
steady-state results. The in￿nite-horizon consumers dominate in the long run, as
is suggested by the earlier work of Judd (1985), Smetters (1999), and Mankiw
(2000). Alternatively, if all consumers have ￿nite horizons, as in Blanchard
(1985), the results change. Yet the changes are quantitatively modest for plau-
sible parameter values. For example, if households have an expected horizon
of 50 years, then the fraction of a capital tax cut paid for by growth falls from
50 percent to 45 percent.
We also consider two widely discussed departures from the neoclassical pro-
duction setting. We ￿rst consider the impact of imperfect competition, for
Judd (2002) has shown that market power can substantially change the analysis
of optimal tax policy. We ￿nd that market power can raise the ability of tax
cuts to be self-￿nancing, but only if there are substantial economic pro￿ts not
dissipated by the ￿xed costs associated with entry. We also examine the possi-
bility that there are positive externalities to capital accumulation, as suggested
by Romer (1987) and DeLong and Summers (1991). In this case, the dynamic
e⁄ects of tax changes are much larger than they are in the standard model.
The neoclassical model yields particularly simple expressions for steady-state
feedback e⁄ects, but it is also important to consider the transition path to the
3steady state. We therefore consider a log-linearized version of the model for the
special case of unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For our canonical
parameter values, we ￿nd that the immediate revenue feedback e⁄ects are quite
similar for capital and labor taxes: slightly more than 10 percent of a tax cut
immediately pays for itself through higher labor supply and national income.
For both types of taxes, the feedbacks grow over time toward their steady-state
values, with the feedback for a capital tax cut reaching halfway after about ten
years.
In all experiments that we consider, the government budget constraint is
satis￿ed, as it must be in any well-speci￿ed model. Throughout the paper, we
assume that some form of lump-sum transfers (or taxes) adjusts in response to
the changes in tax rates. We have in mind such spending programs as welfare,
social security, and farm subsidies. The dynamic scoring question that we are
proposing, then, is how much such transfer spending needs to fall to o⁄set a cut
in tax rates.
Implicit in our use of a model of long-run growth is that we ignore any short-
term e⁄ects of tax cuts that arise from traditional Keynesian channels. Many
government and private-sector analysts have instead emphasized the power of
tax cuts to stimulate a weak economy. Although we abstract from these e⁄ects
in this study, we do not mean to suggest that such e⁄ects are insigni￿cant.
Integrating a model of long-run growth with a model of short-run business cycles
remains a challenge for future research on dynamic scoring.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the basic model and
previews results. Section 2 derives and solves a more general version of the
model which includes elastic labor supply. Section 3 discusses how the results
change if we relax the assumption of in￿nite horizons, and Section 4 investigates
departures from the neoclassical production setting. Section 5 considers the
transition path. Section 6 concludes.
1 The Basic Ramsey Model
Before delving into the details of a more general model, which we do in the next
section, it will be useful for many readers to preview our results for a familiar
special case￿ the steady state of the Ramsey growth model.3 We modify this
model by including taxation at a rate ￿k on capital income and ￿n on all labor
income. The population is normalized to one, and labor is supplied inelastically.
Using conventional notation, we can write the steady state of the economy as
follows:
r = f0(k): (1)
w = f(k) ￿ kf0(k): (2)
(1 ￿ ￿k)r = ￿ + ￿g: (3)
3For standard introductions to the Ramsey model, we refer the reader to Romer (2001),
chapter 2, or to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), chapter 2.
4R = ￿krk + ￿nw: (4)
This system of four equations fully speci￿es the steady-state values of the four
endogenous variables: k is capital per e¢ ciency unit of labor, w is the wage
rate, r is the before-tax rate of return to capital, and R is total tax revenue
per e¢ ciency unit. In addition, f(k) is total output per e¢ ciency unit, ￿ is
the curvature coe¢ cient in our instantaneous utility function (the reciprocal of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), g is the rate of labor-augmenting
technological change, and ￿ is the subjective discount rate. In this section, we
assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
y = f(k) = k￿
where y is output per e¢ ciency unit and the parameter ￿ is capital￿ s share
of income. The next section will consider generalizations of this production
function.
Our goal is to estimate the impact of a tax change on steady-state tax
revenue R. A conventional scoring assuming no dynamic e⁄ects from the tax
cut yields the following results:
dR
d￿k
￿ ￿
￿
￿
static
= rk = ￿y:
dR
d￿n
￿ ￿
￿
￿
static
= w = (1 ￿ ￿)y:
These equations show the impact of a tax change on tax revenue, assuming that
national income and other macroeconomic variables are held constant. Notice
that each of these derivatives equals the tax base of the respective tax.
Dynamic scoring estimates the impact of a tax change, taking into account
the tax change￿ s consequence for growth. By fully di⁄erentiating equations (1)
through (4), we obtain the following results:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
(1 ￿ ￿k)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
: (5)
dR
d￿n
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
dR
d￿n
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
: (6)
These equations show the impact of a tax change on tax revenue, including the
feedback from taxes to national income.
The central goal of this paper is to compare these dynamic and static revenue
estimates. In this conventional Ramsey model, with its assumption of inelastic
labor supply, the revenue impact of a change in the labor income tax rate is the
same under dynamic and static scoring. This explains equation (6). The more
interesting analysis pertains to result (5), the impact of a change in the capital
5tax rate ￿k on tax revenue. Consider the empirically plausible parameter values
of ￿k = ￿n = 1
4 and ￿ = 1
3. Then, (5) yields
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
1
2
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
:
A capital income tax cut has a long-run impact on revenue that is only half
of its static impact. In other words, growth pays for 50 percent of a capital
income tax cut in the steady state.4
This simple example illustrates two lessons. First, dynamic and static rev-
enue estimation can lead to very di⁄erent results. Second, the steady state of
the Ramsey model yields simple expressions that can provide useful benchmarks
for the task of dynamic scoring. In the sections that follow, we develop more
general models to examine the robustness of these conclusions.
2 A More General Ramsey Model
In this and the next three sections, we extend the basic Ramsey model along
a number of dimensions. In this section we include elastic labor supply and a
more general production technology. We also present a more detailed derivation
of our results.
To allow for elastic labor supply, we use a form of preferences over consump-
tion and labor proposed by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). King-Plosser-
Rebelo preferences have the property that the uncompensated elasticity of labor
supply is zero. This feature has the appealing implication that long-run growth
caused by technological progress does not lead to a trend in hours worked. The
compensated (constant-consumption) elasticity of labor supply need not be zero,
however. This parameter, which we will call ￿, will have a signi￿cant role in
some of our results.
2.1 Firms
We begin with production. Assume there are many identical ￿rms in competi-
tive input and output markets, producing output with constant returns to scale
technology according to the production function
Y = F(K;N);
4The feedback depends critically on the tax rate. If the capital tax rate were 0.40 instead
of 0.25, and all other parameter values are the same, the feedback from a capital tax cut would
be 75 percent rather than 50 percent.
The literature on taxation in the United States suggests that our choice of ￿k = ￿n = 0:25
is within the range of plausible estimates, although perhaps a bit conservative. Mendoza,
Razin, and Tesar (1994) estimate a 40.7 percent capital tax rate (applied to corporate and
non-corporate capital) for the United States in 1988, the last year of their series. This is above
the estimate given by Gravelle (2004), who reports a rate of 33 percent for all capital in that
year. Gravelle extends her estimates through 2003, by which point the capital tax rate had
fallen to 23 percent. Mendoza et al. estimate a labor tax rate of 28.5 percent in 1988, together
with a consumption tax of about 5 percent; these tax rates would combine to be equivalent
to a tax on labor of about 31 percent.
6where Y is the total amount of output, K is the total amount of capital, and N
is the total labor input, including the adjustment for labor-augmenting techno-
logical change. That is, if n is the labor input supplied by the representative
household and g is the rate of labor-augmenting technological change, then
N = negt. With these conventions, we can write the production function as
y = f(k;n): (7)
where y = Y=egt is output per e¢ ciency unit and k = K=egt is capital per
e¢ ciency unit. Note that we no longer assume that the production function
f (k;n) is Cobb-Douglas. We will let ￿ denote the capital share and ￿ denote
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.5
Given competitive markets, ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts and capital earns a before-
tax rate of return r equal to its marginal product:
r = fk(k;n): (8)
Each e¢ ciency unit of labor is paid a wage w equal to its marginal product,
w = fn(k;n): (9)
Below, in Section 4, we consider generalizations to non-competitive production
settings.
2.2 Households
We use a conventional, in￿nitely-lived representative household. The house-
hold￿ s instantaneous utility function takes the isoelastic form with curvature
parameter ￿. To incorporate elastic labor supply, we add labor n to the house-
hold￿ s utility function. This labor variable should be intrepreted broadly to
include both time and e⁄ort.
The household￿ s utility function is
U =
Z
e￿￿t(cegt)
1￿￿ e(1￿￿)v(n) ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
dt;
where v(n) is a di⁄erentiable function of labor supply and all other variables
are de￿ned as before. This functional form was introduced by King, Plosser,
and Rebelo (1988) and has been more recently explored by Kimball and Shapiro
(2003).
We can write the household￿ s dynamic budget constraint in per e¢ ciency
unit terms:
_ k = (1 ￿ ￿n)wn + (1 ￿ ￿k)rk ￿ c ￿ gk + T;
lim
t!1
ke(￿r+g)t = 0:
5These variables need not be constant, but they will take on particular values in any steady
state. Speci￿cally, ￿ =
fkk
f(k;n) and ￿ =
fnfk
f(k;n)fkn .
7where _ k is the time derivative of the capital stock per e¢ ciency unit and T
represents lump-sum transfers from the government. The second equation is
the standard transversality condition.
Household maximization yields the following ￿rst-order conditions:
v0(n) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿n)w
c
: (10)
r =
1
1 ￿ ￿k
￿
￿ + ￿
￿
_ c
c
+ g
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)v0(n) ￿ _ n
￿
;
Equation (10) is the static condition determining the allocation of time between
work and leisure. From this equation, one can derive an expression for the
constant-consumption elasticity of labor supply, which we will denote ￿:
￿ =
v0(n)
v00(n) ￿ n
:
In the steady state, consumption per e¢ ciency unit c and the wage per e¢ ciency
unit w are both constant. As a result, labor supply n is constant as well. The
intertemporal ￿rst-order condition therefore reduces to
r =
￿ + ￿g
1 ￿ ￿k
: (11)
This is the same as in Section 1.
In the steady state, _ k = 0, and we can write the steady-state level of con-
sumption as:
c = f(k;n) ￿ gk: (12)
Equations (7) through (12) fully determine the steady-state values of six vari-
ables: y, k, n, r, w, and c.
2.3 Government
Total tax revenue per e¢ ciency unit, denoted R, is the sum of taxes paid on
capital income and labor income:
R = ￿krk + ￿nwn: (13)
The ￿rst term on the right of (13) is the capital tax rate times capital income,
and the second term is the labor tax rate times labor income. The government
collects this revenue and distributes it in the form of lump-sum transfers to
households. For most of our results, the timing of these rebates is irrelevant,
as the consumer is in￿nitely-lived. (Later, when we consider models with ￿nite
horizons, we assume that rebates occur immediately upon receipt of the tax
revenue.)
82.4 Dynamic and Static Steady-State Scoring
A conventional scoring assuming no dynamic e⁄ects from the tax cut yields the
following results for this model:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
= rk = ￿f(k;n):
dR
d￿n
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
= wn = (1 ￿ ￿)f(k;n):
By contrast, to ￿nd the true impact of the tax change on steady-state revenue,
one would use all of the steady-state conditions. This yields the following:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
(￿ + ￿ ￿ 1)￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿k)
(14)
￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
(￿ + ￿g) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿k)g
￿
(￿ + ￿g)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿k)(￿ ￿ ￿)g
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿k)
￿
1 + ￿
￿
￿
dR
d￿k
￿
￿ ￿
￿
static
:
dR
d￿n
￿
￿ ￿
￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)
￿
1 + ￿
￿
dR
d￿n
￿
￿ ￿
￿
static
: (15)
Note that if the labor supply elasticity ￿ equals zero and the elasticity of sub-
stitution ￿ equals unity, then these results reduce to equations (5) and (6) in
the basic model. In general, however, these two parameters play a crucial role
in determining the dynamic e⁄ects of a tax change.
2.5 The Compensated Elasticity of Labor Supply
Let￿ s consider ￿rst the role of the labor supply elasticity ￿. In the case of a
capital tax cut, the labor supply elasticity plays only a small role. If g = 0 and
￿ = 1, then equation (14) is identical to equation (5) from the basic Ramsey
model, and the labor supply elasticity is irrelevant for a change in capital taxes.
In the case of a labor tax cut, however, the elasticity of labor supply plays a key
role. The larger the elasticity of labor supply, the smaller the dynamic revenue
impact of a labor tax cut. From equations (14) and (15), one can show that
if the two tax rates are the same, a capital tax cut will always have a larger
feedback e⁄ect than a labor tax cut.
To illustrate the e⁄ect of elastic labor supply, consider the following plausible
parameter values: ￿k = 1
4;￿n = 1
4, ￿ = 1
3; ￿ = 1;g = :02;￿ = :05;￿ = 1, and
￿ = 1
2: These parameters yield:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿ ￿
￿
dynamic
= 0:47
dR
d￿k
￿
￿ ￿
￿
static
:
9dR
d￿n
￿
￿ ￿
￿
dynamic
= 0:83
dR
d￿n
￿
￿ ￿
￿
static
:
Under these assumptions, a capital tax cut has a long-run impact on revenue of
only 47 percent of its static impact. That is, growth pays for 53 percent of the
static revenue loss. A labor tax cut has a long-run impact on revenue of only
83 percent of its static impact, and growth pays for 17 percent of the tax cut.
These results show that the feedback e⁄ect for a labor tax cut depends
crucially on the compensated elasticity of labor supply. Unfortunately, this is
a parameter over which there is substantial uncertainty.
Kimball and Shapiro (2003) present a recent, extensive discussion of this
parameter, including references to a broad literature. As they note, it is im-
portant to recognize that there are di⁄erent notions of the compensated elastic-
ity: a traditional constant-utility elasticity, a Frisch or constant-marginal utility
elasticity, and a constant-consumption elasticity. Our parameter ￿ represents
the constant-consumption elasticity of labor supply, which Kimball and Shapiro
show is generally larger than the traditional compensated elasticity. Using their
results, one can derive that, for our standard parameter values ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1
3,
the constant-consumption elasticity is about 5
3 the traditional compensated elas-
ticity. Thus, our assumption that ￿ = 0:5 is equivalent to assuming that the
traditional compensated elasticity of labor supply is 0.3. Kimball and Shapiro
estimate that the constant-consumption elasticity is about 1.0 to 1.5. If ￿ is
increased from 0.5 to 1.5 in our calculation, the revenue feedback e⁄ect of a
labor tax cut rises from 17 percent to 30 percent.
Kimball and Shapiro point out there are economists with preferred values on
both sides of their estimates. Labor economists analyzing micro data (e.g., An-
grist, 1991 and Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir, 1998) tend to argue for smaller
elasticities. A survey of labor economists conducted by Fuchs, Krueger, and
Poterba (1998) found that the median labor economist believes the compen-
sated elasticity of labor supply is 0.18 for men and 0.43 for women. By contrast,
macroeconomists working in the real business cycle literature often choose para-
meterizations that imply larger values. Prescott (2004) examines cross-country
data on hours worked and marginal tax rates and ￿nds that these two variables
are strongly correlated. He concludes that this international variation suggests
a (constant-consumption) compensated elasticity of labor supply around 3.6 If
we raise ￿ to 3 in our calculation, the revenue feedback e⁄ect of a labor tax cut
rises to 38 percent.
6One possible way of reconciling these di⁄ering estimates is to generalize the neoclassical
model to include a role for work norms, as suggested by Blomquist (1993) and Grodner and
Kniesner (2003). Suppose an individual￿ s disutility from supplying labor depends on how
much other people are working. That is, working long hours when others are doing so is
not as onerous as working long hours while others are enjoying substantial leisure. In this
case, as Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2002) point out, a "social multiplier" causes
aggregate elasticities to exceed individual elasticities. The larger aggregate elasticity would
be the relevant one for the purposes of dynamic scoring.
102.6 The Elasticity of Substitution
The elasticity of substitution ￿ between capital and labor plays a crucial role
in determining how much of a capital tax cut is self-￿nancing. For example,
if the elasticity of substitution is 1.5 rather than 1.0, and the other parameters
are as speci￿ed above, the dynamic feedback e⁄ect rises from 53 percent to 71
percent. If the elasticity of substitution is 0.75 rather than 1.0, the dynamic
feedback e⁄ect falls from 53 percent to 44 percent.
Like the elasticity of labor supply, there is signi￿cant uncertainty about this
parameter. As Ventura (1997) and Mankiw (1995) point out, international
trade in goods can a⁄ect the degree of substitutability between capital and
labor. In traditional Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory, a nation can move resources
between industries with varying degrees of capital intensity. When a country￿ s
stock of capital increases, it can export capital-intensive goods and import labor-
intensive goods, avoiding changes in the returns to either capital or labor. In
other words, international trade raises the e⁄ective elasticity of substitution in
an economy. One corollary of this line of analysis is that international trade
increases the extent to which capital tax cuts pay for themselves.
On the other hand, exponential depreciation of capital would tend to reduce
the elasticity of substitution. For example, if gross output is produced ac-
cording to a Cobb-Douglas production function k n1￿  and capital depreciates
exponentially at rate ￿, then the net production function is:
f (k;n) = k n1￿  ￿ ￿k:
In this case, the elasticity of substitution ￿ can be written as:
￿ =
￿ k
n
￿ ￿1
  ￿ ￿
￿ k
n
￿ ￿1
  ￿ ￿ 
.
For our canonical parameter values of ￿k = 1
4;￿n = 1
4,   = 1
3; ￿ = 1;g = :02;￿ =
:05; and ￿ = 1
2, if depreciation equals 0:03, then the elasticity of substitution is
0:82.7
These results illustrate that future research on dynamic scoring will need to
focus attention on the compensated elasticity of labor supply and the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor.
3 Finite Horizons
The results we have obtained so far rely on the neoclassical growth model with
its assumption of a representative household who optimizes over an in￿nite
planning horizon. This model is widely used and a natural benchmark. As
7Notice that in the presence of depreciation, the gross capital share and the net capital
share di⁄er. In this example, the gross capital share   = 1
3, while the net capital share
￿ = 0:27. The formulas above for the dynamic e⁄ects of tax changes are expressed in terms
of the net capital share ￿.
11Barro (1974) famously noted, the in￿nite-horizon household can be viewed as
the result of generations￿being linked via altruistic bequests.
Nonetheless, some economists are skeptical of the model￿ s empirical realism.
This raises the question: Would alternative models of household behavior lead
to substantially di⁄erent conclusions about dynamic scoring? It turns out that
our results regarding steady-state feedback e⁄ects are surprisingly robust.
3.1 Rule-of-thumb consumers
A large part of the consumption literature has suggested that current income
exerts a greater in￿ uence on consumer spending than is predicted by the model
of the in￿nitely-lived consumer. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) suggested that
about half of income goes to households who follow the rule of thumb of con-
suming their current income. A prominent role for current income has also been
documented by Shea (1995), Parker (1999), and Souleles (1999).
To see the implications of such behavior for dynamic scoring, suppose the
model is the same as the one presented in Section 1, except that a fraction
of households always consume their current income. How would our previous
results change? The answer is, not at all.
Here is the logic. Equations (1) through (4) pin down the steady state in
the neoclassical growth model. These equations would continue to hold, even
if some consumers spend their current income. The only equation that comes
from household behavior is equation (3). This equation would still obtain: it
would be derived from the intertemporal ￿rst-order condition for the subset of
maximizing consumers. As Judd (1985), Smetters (1999), and Mankiw (2000)
have previously noted, as long as some households behave according to the
neoclassical growth model, the steady state is not at all a⁄ected by a subset of
households who do not.
3.2 The Blanchard Model
Blanchard (1985) suggested another way to relax the Ramsey model￿ s assump-
tion of in￿nite horizons. According to Blanchard￿ s model, all households face
a constant probability p of dying o⁄ every period and being replaced by a new
household. Households respond to this risk by annuitizing all of their wealth.
There are no bequests.8
To keep things simple, we consider a special case similar to the one Blanchard
emphasizes. In particular, we assume inelastic labor supply (￿ = 0), log utility
(￿ = 1), Cobb-Douglas production (￿ = 1), and no technological progress (g =
0). In this case, the following equation determines the steady-state interest rate:
8Annuity markets play a crucial role in the Blanchard model. We have worked out a version
of the Blanchard model in which, instead of annuitizing, households leave accidental bequests,
which we assume are distributed as lump-sum payments to the newly born households. This
alternative model yields the same dynamic feedback e⁄ects as the Ramsey model. Most
likely, reality lies somewhere between the model with no annuitization and the model with
full annuitization.
12r =
1
1 ￿ ￿k
￿
￿ + p(￿ + p)
k
y
￿
: (16)
We skip the derivation of this equation, as it follows immediately from Blan-
chard￿ s equation (12). Note that for the special case of p = 0, the consumer
faces an in￿nite horizon, and we obtain equation (5) from section 1.
The remainder of the Blanchard model is similar to the Ramsey model.
The steady state of the economy is determined by equation (16) together with
equations (1), (2), and (4). Because labor supply is inelastic, labor taxes do not
yield interesting dynamic e⁄ects. Capital taxes, however, yield the following:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿ ￿
￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿
[￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n]2p(￿ + p)
￿2 + 4p(￿ + p)￿(1 ￿ ￿k) ￿ ￿
p
￿2 + 4p(￿ + p)￿(1 ￿ ￿k)
)
￿
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
: (17)
In the limit as p approaches 0, this simpli￿es to equation (5).
This equation shows how ￿nite horizons as modeled by Blanchard a⁄ect
our results regarding dynamic feedback e⁄ects. Figure 1 illustrates how the
feedback e⁄ect varies with the value of p. Recall that for p = 0, we found that
50 percent of a capital tax cut pays for itself in the steady state. If p = :02,
so the average time horizon is ￿fty years, the dynamic feedback e⁄ect falls from
50 to 45 percent. If p = :05, so the average time horizon is twenty years, the
feedback e⁄ect falls to 39 percent.
The bottom line is that the Blanchard generalization of the Ramsey model
does alter our results. For plausible parameter values, however, the changes are
only modest in size.
4 Departures from Neoclassical Production
So far, we have assumed a neoclassical production setting. In this section,
we explore the implications of two departures from this assumption: imperfect
competition and positive externalities to capital investment.
4.1 Imperfect Competition
Many markets in the economy are imperfectly competitive. Because of patents,
copyrights, and ￿xed costs, prices can remain above marginal costs for long
periods. Over the past several decades, models of monopolistic competition
have become increasingly central in the theories of international trade, eco-
nomic growth, and the business cycle. Judd (2002) has recently proposed that
13these models might also be important for the analysis of tax policy. Here we
see whether adding imperfect competition to our generalized Ramsey model in
section 2 alters our results about dynamic scoring.
To incorporate imperfect competition, it is useful to imagine an economy
that produces in two stages. In the ￿rst stage, a competitive sector produces
an intermediate good using capital and labor inputs and a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. Competition ensures that price equals marginal cost. In the
second stage of production, ￿rms use the intermediate good to produce a ￿nal
good that can be used for investment or consumption. Firms in this second
stage produce one unit of the ￿nal good from one unit of intermediate good and
sell the ￿nal good at a markup over marginal cost. They may also face ￿xed
costs of entry. We let ￿ equal the ratio of price to marginal cost in the ￿nal
good industry.
With this market structure, the price of the ￿nal good, P, is
P = ￿PM = ￿MC
where PM is the price of the intermediate good, and MC is the marginal cost
of producing the intermediate good. Hereafter, we let the ￿nal good be the
numeraire, so P = 1:
Because the intermediate good is produced with both capital and labor,
its marginal cost can be computed from the marginal product of either factor.
That is,
MC =
w
fn
=
r
fk
The two equations above yield equilibrium factor prices:
r =
fk
￿
: (18)
w =
fn
￿
: (19)
These two equations replace (8) and (9) from section 2.
The existence of a markup raises the possibility of economic pro￿t. The
￿nal goods producers buy a quantity f(k;n) of the intermediate good and then
earn operating pro￿ts of
￿
￿￿1
￿
￿
f(k;n). We let ￿ be the fraction of operating
pro￿ts that accrue to the owners of the ￿rms as pure economic pro￿ts. That is,
economic pro￿ts are
￿ = ￿
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿
f(k;n):
This formulation allows for the possibility that all of the operating pro￿ts accrue
to ￿rm owners (￿ = 1), that all of the operating pro￿ts are dissipated through
the ￿xed costs associated with entry (￿ = 0), and a range of intermediate cases.
14Because households own ￿rms, economic pro￿ts enter the household budget
constraint. As a result, the steady-state equation (12) becomes:
c =
f (k;n)
￿
+ ￿ ￿ gk: (20)
Economic pro￿ts are assumed to be taxed at a rate ￿￿, so equation (13) becomes:
R = ￿krk + ￿nwn + ￿￿￿: (21)
In the perfect competition case, the steady state of the economy was described
by equations (7) to (13); the comparable system now includes equations (7),
(18), (19), (10), (11), (20), and (21).
Analysis as before yields the following results, assuming Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction (￿ = 1):
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿k)
￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
(1 + ￿(￿ ￿ 1))(￿ + ￿g) ￿ ￿g (1 ￿ ￿k)
￿
1 + ￿
g
￿
dR
d￿k
￿
￿ ￿
￿
static
(22)
dR
d￿n
￿ ￿
￿
￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)
￿
1 + ￿
￿
dR
d￿n
￿ ￿
￿
￿
static
(23)
These equations are the counterparts to equations (14) and (15).
To see how imperfect competition a⁄ects the analysis of dynamic scoring of
capital taxes, we can compare equations (22) and (14). Of course, if ￿ = 1, this
more general model collapses to the earlier one. Note, however, that the two
models become identical also if there are no economic pro￿ts (￿ = 0). Thus,
for imperfect competition to have important implications for dynamic scoring,
it is crucial that not all pro￿ts be dissipated by the ￿xed costs associated with
entry.
To get some sense of the magnitude of the e⁄ects that imperfect competition
might generate, consider our standard parameter values ￿ = 1
3; ￿k = ￿n = 1
4;
￿ = :05; g = :02; ￿ = 1
2; ￿ = 1, and let ￿￿ = 1
4. For a 25 percent markup ￿
￿ = 5
4
￿
and no pro￿t dissipation (￿ = 1), the feedback e⁄ect from a capital tax
cut is now 65 percent, compared to 53 percent under perfect competition.9
Similar conclusions hold for labor tax changes. By comparing equation (23)
with equation (15), we can see that the two cases become identical if there are
9Notice that this calculation holds the tax on economic pro￿t constant at a rate of 25
percent. If economic pro￿ts were not taxed (￿￿ = 0), then the dynamic feedback would be
almost identical to our base case with perfect competition: it would be 52 rather than 53
percent. Alternatively, one might assume that economic pro￿ts were taxed at the same rate
as capital income. If so, then cutting the capital tax would also entail cutting the economic
pro￿ts tax, which would reduce the dynamic feedback substantially￿ from 53 percent to 37
percent. It is unclear which assumption is best, as the economic pro￿ts generated by market
power could accrue either to the owners of capital or to the suppliers of labor via union
contracts.
15no markups (￿ = 1), if there are no economic pro￿ts (￿ = 0), or if economic
pro￿ts are not taxed (￿￿ = 0). On the other hand, if ￿ = 1, ￿ = 5
4, and ￿￿ = 1
4,
the feedback e⁄ect of a labor tax cut is 21 percent, compared to 16.7 percent in
the benchmark case.
Thus, imperfect competition raises the ability of tax cuts to be self-￿nancing
only if it generates pure economic pro￿ts. If the ￿xed costs associated with
entry dissipate all pro￿ts, then imperfect competition as modeled in this section
acts like an adverse shift in the production function, lowering capital accumula-
tion, consumption, and welfare, but having no e⁄ect on dynamic scoring of tax
changes.
4.2 Externalities to Capital
In the model examined in Section 2, capital earns its marginal product. Some
economists, however, have suggested that the social marginal product of capital
exceeds its private marginal product. DeLong and Summers (1991) estimate
that "the social [rate of] return to equipment investment in well-functioning
market economies is on the order of 30 percent per year," which is more than
twice the private rate of return. Romer (1987, pp. 165-166) suggests "The
correct weight on the growth of capital in a growth accounting exercise may be
closer to 1 than to 0.25. The true elasticity of output with respect to changes
in capital may be greater than the share of capital in total income because of
positive externalities associated with investment." In this section, we modify
the model in section 2 to include such externalities to capital.
Suppose that each ￿rm￿ s production yi is Cobb-Douglas but is a function
not only of its own capital ki, but also of the general pool of knowledge, ￿:
yi = ￿k￿
i n
1￿￿
i :
Each ￿rm takes ￿ as given. However, ￿ is assumed to be an increasing function
of the average ￿rm￿ s level of capital, k:
￿ = k￿: (24)
The parameters ￿ and ￿ measure the direct (private) and indirect (social) bene-
￿ts of capital. That is, ￿ determines the distribution of income between capital
and labor, but ￿+￿ determines the rate at which diminishing returns set in for
economy-wide capital accumulation.
In addition to (24), the steady-state conditions for this economy are as fol-
lows:
y = ￿k￿n1￿￿: (25)
r = ￿￿k￿￿1n1￿￿: (26)
w = (1 ￿ ￿)￿k￿n￿￿: (27)
v0(n) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿n)w
c
: (28)
16r =
￿ + ￿g
1 ￿ ￿k
: (29)
c = ￿k￿n1￿￿ ￿ gk: (30)
Equations (24) through (30) fully determine the steady-state values of seven
variables: ￿, y, k, n, r, w, and c. The equation for tax revenue remains the
same as equation (13):
R = ￿krk + ￿nwn: (31)
In this setting, the dynamic feedback e⁄ects are as follows:
dR
d￿k
￿
￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
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￿
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static
: (32)
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￿
￿ ￿
dynamic
=
￿
1 ￿
￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n
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(1 + ￿)
￿
dR
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￿
￿
￿ ￿
static
: (33)
These results are analogous to equations (14) and (15).
The quantitative e⁄ects of externalities are potentially large. As before,
consider the canonical values ￿k = 1
4;￿n = 1
4, ￿ = 1
3; ￿ = 1;g = :02;￿ = :05;
and ￿ = 1
2. Recall that in our Ramsey model of Section 2, 53 percent of a
capital tax cut and 17 percent of a labor tax cut are self-￿nancing. Suppose
￿ = 1
12, so that the externality from capital raises the return to capital by one-
quarter (much smaller than DeLong and Summers 1991 estimate). Equations
(32) and (33) yield
dR
d￿k
￿ ￿
￿
￿
dynamic
= :26
dR
d￿k
￿ ￿
￿
￿
static
:
dR
d￿n
￿ ￿
￿
￿
dynamic
= :81
dR
d￿n
￿ ￿
￿
￿
static
:
In this case, growth pays for 74 percent of a capital tax cut and 19 percent
of a labor tax cut. These calculations indicate that modest externalities to
capital slightly raise the dynamic feedbacks associated with labor income taxes
and signi￿cantly raise the feedbacks associated with capital income taxes.
At this point, we should acknowledge that the existence and magnitude of
these externalities are both speculative and controversial. Our analysis suggests
that measuring their magnitude is crucial for the task of dynamic scoring.
175 Transitional Dynamics
The results presented so far in this paper consider only the economy￿ s steady
state. This section examines how our steady-state results from Section 2 are
a⁄ected by considering the transition paths of labor supply and capital. After
a tax cut, the capital stock, which is initially ￿xed, will gradually increase to its
new steady-state level. Labor supply will immediately jump and then approach
its new steady state.
We derive our results from a log-linearized version of a system of di⁄erential
equations that describe the model dynamics. Readers who wish to see the
derivation of the results of this section are referred to Mankiw and Weinzierl
(2004). To keep things simple, we assume log utility (￿ = 1), Cobb-Douglas
production (￿ = 1) and no technological change (g = 0).
To compute the path of tax revenues, we need the transition paths of n
and k and the values of n and k at three points in time: prior to the tax cut,
immediately after the tax cut, and in the long-run steady state after the tax
cut. Denote the levels of n and k at these three points as n0; n"; and n￿, and
k0; k"; and k￿. Similarly, let R0;R"; and R￿ denote tax revenues per period
prior to, immediately after, and in the long run after a tax cut. Using this
notation, the transition paths can be written as:
lnnt ￿ lnn￿ = (lnn" ￿ lnn￿)e￿t; (34)
lnkt ￿ lnk￿ = (lnk" ￿ lnk￿)e￿t: (35)
where ￿ is equal to the negative eigenvalue of the characteristic matrix of the
system of di⁄erential equations. Both n and k, and thus R, transition from
their jump values to their steady-state values at this rate.
Tax revenues at any time t can be written as:
Rt = [￿￿k + (1 ￿ ￿)￿n]k￿
t n
1￿￿
t : (36)
This allows us to compute tax revenue at any point in time. With equations
(34)-(36) and the model￿ s steady-state conditions from Section 2, we can cal-
culate how much of the static impact of a tax cut is paid for over any given
period. Table 1 shows these calculations for selected points along the transi-
tion path. We continue to assume our canonical values for the other parameters:
￿k = 1
4;￿n = 1
4, ￿ = 1
3; ￿ = 1
2.
Recall that, for a capital tax cut, the feedback e⁄ect in the steady state is 50
percent. By contrast, the immediate feedback is 10.6 percent, as labor supply
jumps up in response to the tax cut. The feedback is 21.3 percent by the ￿fth
year, 29.1 percent by the tenth year, and 42 percent by the twenty-￿fth year.
For a labor tax cut, the feedback e⁄ect in the steady state is 16.7 percent.
The immediate feedback is 12.3 percent. The feedback is 13.5 percent by the
￿fth year, 14.3 percent by the tenth year, and 15.8 percent by the twenty-￿fth
year.
The immediate jump in labor supply plays a vital role in the timing of the
feedback e⁄ects. The elasticity of labor supply determines the size of this initial
18jump. If ￿ = 3, the instantaneous feedback of a labor tax cut is 32.6 percent,
compared to a steady-state feedback of 38 percent. For the case of a capital tax
cut, the instantaneous feedback is 30.4 percent, while the steady-state feedback
remains 50 percent.
One way to summarize the transition to the steady state is by calculating the
present value of the reduced tax revenue, using the after-tax return to capital
along the transition path to discount the revenue streams. By comparing the
present value of the dynamic and static estimates, we obtain the ￿present-value￿
feedback e⁄ect, which is, in essence, a weighted average of the feedback e⁄ects
along the entire path. For the canonical parameter values we have been using,
the present-value feedback of a capital tax cut is 32.4 percent, compared to a
steady-state feedback of 50 percent. The present-value feedback of a labor tax
cut is 14.7 percent, compared to a steady-state feedback of 16.7 percent.
The foregoing analysis of transitional dynamics is based on a linearization
of the model. To check the accuracy of this linearization, we have also con-
ducted simulations of the nonlinear model using Matlab. The results from the
linearized model are quite accurate, although of course not perfectly so. For
example, Table 2 shows the present-value feedback e⁄ect for various sized capi-
tal and labor tax changes and compares the results to what the linearized model
predicts. Even for tax changes of ￿ve percentage points, the linearized model
estimates feedback e⁄ects that di⁄er from the nonlinear estimates by less than
three percentage points. Note that the linearization overestimates the feedback
e⁄ects for sizeable tax cuts but underestimates them for sizeable tax increases.
This asymmetry can be explained by the positive relationship between the feed-
back e⁄ects of tax changes and the initial tax rate, as discussed in footnote
4. For example, following a sizeable tax increase, the economy is in a more
distorted position, magnifying the feedback e⁄ects of tax changes.
Overall, the analysis of transitional dynamics demonstrates that the task
of dynamic scoring is particularly important over longer time horizons. The
time horizon is critical when analyzing capital taxes. In practical discussions
of budget policy, scoring windows are only ￿ve or ten years. The generalized
Ramsey model shows that many signi￿cant e⁄ects occur outside of this window.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the issue of dynamic scoring using the textbook neo-
classical growth model and some generalizations of it. Our goal has been to
provide theoretical guidance for economists interested in estimating the revenue
e⁄ects of tax changes. The simple formulas we have derived permit back-of-
the-envelope calculations that illustrate the degree to which tax cuts are self-
￿nancing.
In all of the models considered here, the dynamic response of the economy
to tax changes is too large to be ignored. In almost all cases, tax cuts are partly
self-￿nancing. This is especially true for cuts in capital income taxes.
Not surprisingly, the results of this exercise depend on a number of key pa-
19rameters. Because the values of some of these parameters are open to debate,
reasonable people can disagree about the magnitude of the feedback e⁄ects.
Three crucial parameters are the compensated elasticity of labor supply, the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and the externality to cap-
ital accumulation. Unfortunately, the empirical literature does not give clear
guidance about their magnitudes. The degree of imperfect competition may
also be important, but only to the extent that market power leads to pure eco-
nomic pro￿ts. Finally, the time horizon of consumers, although important for
many questions in economics, appears not to be crucial for the task of dynamic
scoring.
Although we have explored several variations of the basic Ramsey model to
evaluate the robustness our conclusions, there are surely issues still to be ad-
dressed. As we noted earlier, some economists have emphasized the short-run
Keynesian e⁄ects of tax policy, and these e⁄ects may be important for dynamic
scoring. In addition, much of the literature on economic growth has stressed the
role of human capital, which is absent from the models considered here. How
tax policy a⁄ects human capital accumulation and how human capital a⁄ects
economic growth are hard questions, but they may be crucial for revenue es-
timation, especially over longer time periods. Finally, examining alternative
￿nancing regimes may also prove fruitful; our assumption that lump-sum trans-
fers adjust immediately to revenue changes has usefully simpli￿ed the problem
but may be empirically unrealistic. In light of all the open questions, the results
presented in this paper should be viewed only as ￿rst steps.
Policy economists will need to focus the next steps on evaluating which
generalizations of the basic model are most salient and then estimating the key
parameters. The task is pressing. In 2003, the U.S. House of Representatives
adopted a rule that requires the sta⁄ of the Joint Committee on Taxation to
analyze the macroeconomic impact of any major tax bill before the House can
consider the bill. One conclusion is impossible to escape: di¢ cult as it may be,
the subject of dynamic scoring should remain a high priority for those economists
advising lawmakers on issues of tax policy.
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Figure 1: Dynamic Feedback in the Blanchard Model
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Ramsey result
 
 
 
Percent of static revenue impact offset by higher growth
Time Capital tax cut Labor tax cut
Immediate impact 10.6 12.3
1 year 13.0 12.6
3 years 17.4 13.0
5 years 21.3 13.5
10 years 29.1 14.3
25 years 42.0 15.8
50 years 48.4 16.5
Steady-state impact 50.0 16.7
Table 1: Dynamic Feedback Effects along the Transition Path
 
 
   25 
Percent of static revenue impact offset by change in growth
Type of analysis Capital taxes Labor taxes
Linearized model NA 32.4 14.7
+0.05 35.2 17.1
+0.02 33.5 15.6
+0.01 33.0 15.2
+0.001 32.5 14.8
−0.001 32.4 14.7
−0.01 31.9 14.3
−0.02 31.3 13.8
−0.05 29.7 12.5
Table 2: Present Value of Dynamic Feedback from Tax Changes
Simulated tax rate 
change (from starting 
tax rates of 0.25)
 